I. INTRODUCTION
States differ in a number of respects with regard to the conditions under which surrogacy contracts are enforceable. Some states distinguish between gestational and traditional (genetic) surrogacy contracts, treating the former but not the latter as enforceable, 1 whereas others make no such distinction. 2 Some states distinguish between commercial and non-commercial surrogacy, 3 whereas others make no such distinction. 4 In short, there is a patchwork of laws regarding the conditions under which surrogacy contracts are enforceable. in part because such a child is more likely to look like the surrogate's other children, 18 the child might be much more difficult to surrender at birth. 19 Would-be commissioning couples and would-be surrogates can take into account the differing costs and benefits of traditional versus gestational surrogacy agreements. A separate question is whether states should take into account some of the differences between the two types of contracts when deciding the conditions, if any, under which such contracts will be enforceable. 20 
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One of the most well-known cases 21 involving surrogacy is In re Baby M, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of a contract involving traditional surrogacy. 22 William Stern entered into a contract with Mary Beth Whitehead, providing that "through artificial insemination using Mr. Stern's sperm, Mrs. Whitehead would become pregnant, carry the child to term, bear it, deliver it to the Sterns, and thereafter do whatever was necessary to terminate her maternal rights so that Mrs. Stern could thereafter adopt the child." 23 After several artificial insemination attempts, Whitehead became pregnant and carried the child to term. 24 However, she realized shortly after the child's birth that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for her to surrender the child. 25 Whitehead surrendered the child to the Sterns. 26 However, the next day she told them that she was suffering terribly and had to have the child back, if only for a week, after which she would return the child. 27 The Sterns permitted her to have the child for the week. 28 When it became clear that Mary Beth Whitehead would not voluntarily relinquish the child, 29 William Stern secured an ex parte order requiring her to do so. 30 With the Sterns present, a process server aided by the police went to retrieve the child. 31 However, there was some confusion about the child's name, perhaps because the Sterns called her by one name and the Whiteheads called her by another. 32 That confusion created the opportunity 33 for the child to be handed out of a window to Richard Whitehead, who then fled. 34 24 Id. at 1236. 25 Id. ("Mrs. Whitehead realized, almost from the moment of birth, that she could not part with this child."). 26 Id. ("Despite powerful inclinations to the contrary, she turned her child over to the Sterns on March 30 at the Whiteheads' home."). 27 Id. at 1236-37. 28 Id. at 1237 ("The Sterns, . . . believing that Mrs. Whitehead would keep her word, turned the child over to her."). 29 Id. ("Due to Mrs. Whitehead's refusal to relinquish the baby, Mr. Stern filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the surrogacy contract."). 30 Id. (" [T] he order was entered, ex parte."). 31 Id. (" [T] he process server, aided by the police, in the presence of the Sterns, entered Mrs. Whitehead's home to execute the order."). 33 In re Baby M II, 537 A.2d at 1237 (" [T] hose who came to enforce the order were thrown off balance by a dispute over the child's current name."). 34 Id. ("Mr. Whitehead fled with the child, who had been handed to him through a window."). The Whiteheads went to Florida, staying at various locations. 35 During this period, William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead would occasionally have conversations where Mrs. Whitehead would falsely accuse Mr. Stern of molesting one of her daughters. Mrs. Whitehead would sometimes threaten to kill herself and the child during these conversations. 36 When holding the surrogacy contract unenforceable, 37 the Baby M court made clear that it was interpreting New Jersey law and public policy rather than the state constitution, 38 which meant that the New Jersey legislature could have offered its own statutory framework regulating surrogacy had it desired to do so. 39 Nonetheless, the court's view of surrogacy was not difficult to discern. 40 The Baby M court noted that it was not inalterably opposed to all forms of surrogacy-"[w]e find no offense to our present laws where a woman voluntarily and without payment agrees to act as a 'surrogate' mother, provided that she is not subject to a binding agreement to surrender her child." 41 However, as the court fully understood, not many individuals would be willing to be surrogates absent payment-"it is unlikely that surrogacy will survive without money." 42 The state supreme court seemed to treat the dispute between Stern and Whitehead as if it were between two biological parents who simply had different spouses. "With the surrogacy contract disposed of, the legal framework becomes a dispute between two couples over the custody of a child produced by the artificial 35 Id. ("The Whiteheads immediately fled to Florida with Baby M. They stayed initially with Mrs. Whitehead's parents . . . . For the next three months, the Whiteheads and Melissa lived at roughly twenty different hotels, motels, and homes in order to avoid apprehension."). 36 Id. ("From time to time Mrs. Whitehead would call Mr. Stern to discuss the matter . . . accompanied by threats of Mrs. Whitehead to kill herself, to kill the child, and falsely to accuse Mr. Stern of sexually molesting Mrs. Whitehead's other daughter."). 37 Id. at 1235 ("Under current law, however, the surrogacy agreement before us is illegal and invalid."). 38 Id. at 1234 ("We invalidate the surrogacy contract because it conflicts with the law and public policy of this State."). 39 Id. at 1235 ("[O]ur holding today does not preclude the Legislature from altering the current statutory scheme, within constitutional limits, so as to permit surrogacy contracts."). 40 See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 41 In re Baby M II, 537 A.2d at 1235. 42 Id. at 1248. No extra weight would be given to the rights of one parent over the rights of another.
44
The court awarded custody of the child to Stern based on a best interests analysis, 45 and it remanded the case for a determination of an appropriate visitation schedule between mother and child. 46 The New Jersey Supreme Court offered some implicit and some explicit guidance to the trial court to which the case would be remanded. The court mentioned "the Whiteheads' flight to Florida with Baby M," 47 and "the telephone threats to kill Baby M and to accuse Mr. Stern of sexual abuse of her daughter." 48 However, the court did not seem to believe these threats and accusations to be especially problematic, instead stating: "We do not find it so clear that her efforts to keep her infant, when measured against the Sterns' efforts to take her away, make one, rather than the other, the wrongdoer."
49
The court issued some directions to be taken into consideration on remand. For example, "Mrs. Whitehead is entitled to visitation at some point, and that question is not open to the trial court on this remand." 50 Further, the court made clear what it thought of the recommendation that Mary Beth Whitehead not be allowed to have contact with the child for years. "It also should be noted that the guardian's recommendation of a five-year delay is most unusual-one might argue that it begins to border on termination." 51 43 Id. at 1256. 44 Id. ("Under the Parentage Act the claims of the natural father and the natural mother are entitled to equal weight, i.e., one is not preferred over the other solely because he or she is the father or the mother.") (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40 (West 2013) ("The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents."). 45 Id. at 1234 ("[W]e grant custody to the natural father, the evidence having clearly proved such custody to be in the best interests of the infant . . . ."). 46 Id. at 1234-35 ("We remand the issue of the natural mother's visitation rights to the trial court . . . ."). 47 Id. at 1257. 48 Id. 49 Id. at 1259. 50 Id. at 1263. 51 Id. While ostensibly directing the trial court to make its own determination, 52 the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that "Mrs. Whitehead was rather harshly judged-both by the trial court and by some of the experts."
53
The court may have been correct that Whitehead did not pose a threat to the child, and her kidnapping and threatening to kill the child were merely her inappropriate reactions during a stressful situation. 54 However, parents might lose visitation entirely for such actions in other contexts, 55 and the court's claim that it would not sacrifice the interests of the child as a way of manifesting its strong disapproval of surrogacy agreements was not entirely credible.
56
For example, the court issued a warning to fathers who sought temporary custody during a surrogacy contract dispute in New Jersey: "Any application by the natural father in a surrogacy dispute for custody pending the outcome of the litigation will henceforth require proof of unfitness, of danger to the child, or the like, of so high a quality and persuasiveness as to make it unlikely that such application will succeed."
57
But the court thereby imposed a higher standard for the father to meet than would be imposed in a custody context where surrogacy was not at issue.
58
Perhaps because of its focus on assuring that Whitehead would be awarded visitation, 59 the Baby M court failed to discuss several issues that would be relevant 52 Id. at 1263 ("The trial court will determine what kind of visitation shall be granted to her, with or without conditions, and when and under what circumstances it should commence."). 53 Id. at 1259. 54 Cf. id. at 1239 ("The resulting pressure, Mrs. Whitehead contends, caused her to act in ways that were atypical of her ordinary behavior when not under stress, and to act in ways that were thought to be inimical to the child's best interests . . . ."). 55 See El Idrissi v. El Idrissi, 377 A.2d 330, 334 (Conn. 1977) (affirming ex-husband's loss of all visitation because, inter alia, he threatened to kidnap and harm the child). See also In re Baby M II, 537 A.2d at 1239 ("She [the guardian ad litem] first took the position, based on her experts' testimony, that the Sterns should have primary custody, and that while Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights should not be terminated, no visitation should be allowed for five years. As a result of subsequent developments . . . her view has changed. She now recommends that no visitation be allowed at least until Baby M reaches maturity."). 56 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. 57 In re Baby M II, 537 A.2d at 1261. 58 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-3 (West 2013) ("Until the court determines the final custody of the minor child and unless the parties agree otherwise, the court shall determine temporary custody based upon the best interests of the child with due regard to the caretaking arrangement that previously existed."). 59 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. but it is common for a child support claim to be pursued by the party granted custody in a surrogacy case where custody had been challenged. 75 The state supreme court chided the trial court for its analysis, as if to imply that the trial court knew that upholding the validity of the contract was error. "Although clearly expressing its view that the surrogacy contract was valid, the trial court devoted the major portion of its opinion to the question of the baby's best interests." as if it would make no sense to discuss the child's interests if the court were going to enforce the contract anyway. Yet, there are at least two reasons that the criticism of the trial court was not well-founded. First, the trial court may well have been offering its best interests analysis in case its holding the contract enforceable was reversed on appeal. interests analysis appropriate even if the contract was enforceable, because best interests would be considered if the commissioning father's spouse wanted to adopt the child.
79
Neither the trial court nor the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether courts should consider best interests before enforcing a surrogacy contract.
80
If a state were to employ a best interests test before a surrogacy contract could be enforced, one might expect would-be commissioning couples to take that requirement into account when deciding whether or where to enter into a surrogacy contract.
81
All else equal, a commissioning couple might seek to avoid a state with a requirement that a best interests analysis be performed before the contract could be enforced-the couple might not want to take a chance that a court would decide against them or might prefer to avoid litigation costs by entering into a surrogacy contract in a state less willing to entertain such challenges.
82
In the alternative, the couple might be incentivized to choose a surrogate who would be less likely to mount a best interests challenge successfully. 79 See id. ("If there is compliance with the contract terms, adoption will be necessary; hence, court inquiry about best interests must take place."). 80 Cf. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 789 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("To determine who is the legal mother of a child born of a gestational surrogacy arrangement, I would apply the standard most protective of child welfare-the best interests of the child."). 81 See Nicolas, supra note 5, at 1240-49 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of entering into surrogacy contracts in differing states). 82 
Cf. Austin Caster, Don't Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary Litigation and Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law
Regime, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 477, 504 (2011) (noting that the lack of certainty about who would be the child's parents "will continue to increase unnecessary litigation"). Calvert. The Calverts had provided their own gametes to create embryos via IVF and intended to raise any child born of the surrogacy. 85 When the child was born, both Anna and Crispina claimed to be the child's mother. 86 In affirming that Crispina was the mother, the California Supreme Court suggested that where one woman has provided her own gametes and another woman has given birth to a child, "she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own . . . is the natural mother under California law." 87 When holding that Crispina Calvert was the legal mother, the Johnson court was offering an analysis of California law and policy, 85 See id. at 778. 86 Id. ("Mark and Crispina responded with a lawsuit, seeking a declaration they were the legal parents of the unborn child. Anna filed her own action to be declared the mother of the child, and the two cases were eventually consolidated."). 87 Id. at 782. 88 Id. at 779. 89 See id. at 783 ("In deciding the issue of maternity under the Act we have felt free to take into account the parties' intentions, as expressed in the surrogacy contract, because in our view the agreement is not, on its face, inconsistent with public policy." 93 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784 ("Gestational surrogacy differs in crucial respects from adoption and so is not subject to the adoption statutes."); see also id. at 785 ("We are unpersuaded that gestational surrogacy arrangements are so likely to cause the untoward results Anna cites as to demand their invalidation on public policy grounds."). Other courts have also distinguished between traditional and gestational surrogacy, emphasizing that the important difference between the two lies in the existence of a genetic link between the child and the surrogate in one type but not the other. 94 The Johnson court framed the dispute between Anna Johnson and Crispina Calvert as one where each woman had a legitimate basis for claiming to be the child's mother. 95 But that left open whether a woman using donated eggs and a gestational surrogate would have any basis for claiming that she was the child's legal mother. A California intermediate appellate court later answered that question in the affirmative.
96

III. THE EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE
The trend in surrogacy jurisprudence has been to make gestational, but not traditional, surrogacy contracts enforceable. 97 However, several recent cases cast doubt on that understanding of the jurisprudence, demonstrating both some reluctance to give effect to gestational surrogacy agreements and some willingness to give effect to traditional surrogacy agreements. [W] e would be remiss to leave unstated the obvious fact that a gestational surrogate, whose pregnancy does not involve her own egg, may have a different legal position from a traditional surrogate, whose pregnancy does involve her own egg."); Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 804 (Conn. 2011) ("[I]ntended parents who are parties to a valid gestational agreement acquire parental status and are entitled to be named as parents on the replacement birth certificate, without respect to their biological relationship to the children."). 95 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781. 96 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding woman who intended to raise child born of surrogacy was child's legal mother, notwithstanding her not having carried the child to term and her not having a genetic connection to the child). and it would be reasonable to think that parentage issues would be relatively straightforward in those cases. Yet, even in uncontested surrogacy cases, states may be unwilling to permit the members of a commissioning couple to be recognized as the legal parents of a child born through a surrogacy arrangement. 
103
The husband was genetically related to the child, 104 but the wife was not.
105
This case did not involve a gestational surrogate who had a change of heart before or after delivering the child-on the contrary, she surrendered her parental rights three days after giving birth. 103 Id. at 389. 104 Id. at 388. 105 Id. at 389 (" [T] here is no genetic connection between the child born of this IVF procedure and . . . A.L.S."). 106 Id. ("The child, T.D.S., was born on July 7, 2009. Three days later, the gestational carrier relinquished all parental rights to the child."). 
107
A trial court ordered the birth certificate to reflect the husband and wife as the birth parents, as long as the gestational surrogate voluntarily terminated her own maternal rights.
108
The State Registrar challenged that decision, 109 and the trial court then held that state law did not permit the wife to be named the child's mother on the birth certificate.
110
She instead would have to establish her relationship via a stepparent adoption.
111
The trial court opinion was affirmed on appeal, 112 and an equally divided supreme court affirmed that decision. 113 This decision meant that the gestational surrogate was the child's legal mother, 114 despite having no desire for the rights and responsibilities of parentage.
115
As a matter of public policy, New Jersey's position is regrettable, at least in part, because the initial trial court decision was hardly revolutionary
116
-it was only naming the wife as the child's mother if the gestational surrogate renounced her own parental rights. 117 107 Id. ("Plaintiffs expressly rejected adoption because the extended legal process would place the legal status of the child in limbo."). 108 Id. ("The trial court ordered that the birth certificate to be placed on file for this child was to reflect T.J.S. as the father and A.L.S. as the mother, provided that, as to the latter, the gestational carrier, A.F., surrender her rights to the child seventy-two hours after giving birth."). 109 Id. ("Shortly thereafter, the State Registrar learned of the pre-birth order and promptly moved to vacate the portion of the order directing A.L.S. to be listed as the mother on the child's birth certificate."). 110 Id. which hardly seems desirable as a matter of public policy. 122 Or, suppose that the commissioning father were to die during the pregnancy. The only parent the child would have-the surrogate-would be someone who had expressly renounced in the contract her intention to parent that child.
123
The surrogate could voluntarily terminate her parental rights, 124 but that would not mean that the intended mother would have the opportunity to parent the child, especially if the state disfavored private placements.
125
In T.J.S., the woman who embraced the opportunity to have the rights and obligations of parentage was (temporarily) denied that opportunity, while the woman who desired neither 126 was nonetheless given the rights and obligations until her 118 In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 264 (Hoens, J., concurring). Even after the surrogate gave up those rights, the would-be mother was forced to overcome additional obstacles before she could become the child's legal mother.
128
It is hard to understand how making it more difficult for the would-be mother to establish her legal relationship in this case benefits the child, 129 and it is easy to imagine situations where the child might be harmed instead.
T.J.S.
suggests that neither gestational nor traditional surrogacy contracts are enforceable in New Jersey. 130 Justice Hoens, in her T.J.S. concurrence, suggested that the child was "biologically related to A.F., to whom the Legislature has afforded statutory rights and to whom the Constitution likewise grants protection." 131 Justice Albin, in his dissenting opinion, emphasized that this would have been a different case if the surrogate had a change of heart, indicating that he or others might not have dissented if the gestational surrogate had refused to terminate her parental rights.
132
Perhaps the New Jersey legislature will again try to pass legislation specifying the conditions under which surrogacy agreements are enforceable.
133
Absent that, it seems likely that no surrogacy contracts will be enforceable in the state for the foreseeable future.
Tennessee
Tennessee law regarding gestational surrogacy is especially confusing when the intended mother does not have a genetic connection to the child. 134 In In re Adoption of A.F.C., a married couple entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement 127 Id. at 269 (Albin, J., dissenting) ("The surrogate, three days after the birth of the child, knowingly and voluntarily relinquished her parental rights."). 128 Id. at 274 (Albin, J., dissenting) (discussing "the delay and the cost of the adoption process"). 129 See id. at 276 (Albin, J., dissenting) ("The time and cost involved in second-parent adoption is more than a mere inconvenience . . . it is a considerable burden placed on the intended mother."). 130 See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 131 In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d at 266 (Hoens, J., concurring). 132 Id. at 273 (Albin, J., dissenting). 133 See Ruth, supra note 114, at 388 ("While many hoped the Legislature's consideration of the issue in 2012 would provide a solution, Governor Christie vetoed the bill, stopping progress in its tracks."). 134 For a discussion of how gestational surrogacy contacts are treated when the gametes of the husband and wife are used, see infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text. The intended husband had used his sperm to fertilize a donated egg, which was then implanted in the surrogate's uterus.
136
A day before the child was born, the intended parents (father D.F.C. and mother C.M.C.
137
) filed a motion for a declaration of parentage, 138 which was granted.
139
In a separate action, C.M.C. filed a motion to adopt the child, which was also granted. 140 The Tennessee Department of Health (the "Department") intervened in the parentage action, arguing that the surrogate's name should be on the birth certificate and that the intended mother could only have her name on a new birth certificate via a stepparent adoption.
141
The Department also sought to set aside the adoption proceeding and to consolidate the parentage and adoption proceedings.
142
The court consolidated the proceedings, ordered that the initial birth certificate list the mother as unknown, 143 and also ordered that a new birth certificate be issued listing the intended mother as the mother by adoption.
144
Both the intended parents and the Department appealed.
145
The intermediate appellate court reasoned that the Department had challenged the court order requiring that the birth certificate list the mother as unknown but had not challenged the court order naming the intended mother as the child's legal 135 In re Adoption of A.F.C., 491 S.W.3d 316, 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). 136 Id. ("Per their agreement, Intended Mother and Father obtained an egg from an anonymous, surrogate egg donor; the egg was fertilized in vitro with Father's sperm, and the fertilized egg was implanted in J.L.B.'s uterus."). 137 Id. 138 Id. 139 Id. ("The court entered an Order of Parentage on August 1 holding that Father was the legal father and Intended Mother was the 'legal mother' of the Child."). 140 Id. 141 Id. 142 Id. 143 Id. at 317-18. 144 Id. at 318. 145 Id. 
146
This ruling meant that the intended parents had, in effect, received the remedy sought-the declaration that C.M.C. was the legal mother.
147
Because the issue of whether C.M.C. was the child's legal parent did not "present[] an actual, ongoing controversy," 148 the court declined to address that issue and instead focused its attention on who should be on the birth certificate. The court noted that the certificate includes:
[D]etailed medical information regarding the mother's pregnancy, including the date of her first and last prenatal care visits and the number of total visits; height; prepregnancy weight and weight at delivery; whether she received food assistance; number of previous births, pregnancies, and the outcomes of those events; whether she smoked cigarettes before and/or during the pregnancy; and the date of her last menses. The form includes detailed information about the birth itself, including risk factors of the pregnancy; obstetric procedures; infections present and/or treated during the pregnancy; onset of labor; characteristics of labor and delivery; method of delivery; and maternal morbidity. 149 This information involved matters occurring during the pregnancy or at birth, which convinced the appellate court that the birth mother should be listed on the certificate.
150
The court reversed the lower court's ruling that the mother should be listed as unknown and instead held that the gestational surrogate's name should be listed on the certificate.
151
A.F.C. suggests that in an uncontested gestational surrogacy, the surrogate should be listed on the original birth certificate as the mother, but that the intended mother should be recognized as the child's legal mother. 152 However, that approach 146 Id. at 319 ("The Department appeals the ruling that the birth certificate should show the mother as 'unknown'; the Department does not challenge the court's ruling that Intended Mother is the 'legal mother.'"). 147 Id. ("Consequently, to the extent Intended Parents sought a declaration that Intended Mother is the 'legal mother,' they have effectively received the relief that they sought in both proceedings."). 148 Id. at 320. 149 Id. at 321. 150 See id. 151 Id. has not been universally adopted in Tennessee, even in uncontested gestational surrogacy cases.
153
In re Amadi A. 154 involved a gestational surrogacy agreement in which the commissioning couple, the surrogate, and her husband all sought to have the intended parents' names on the birth certificates.
155
A court ordered the Tennessee Department of Health to issue birth certificates naming the intended parents as the children's parents, 156 but the Department filed a motion to set aside the portion of that order "finding that Mrs. A, the 'non-genetic, non-gestational intended mother,' was the legal mother of the children and entitled to have her name listed on the original birth certificates." 157 After considering the Department's objections, the court held that the gestational surrogate had to be listed as the children's mother 158 and that the "nonbiological parent must adopt in order to obtain parental rights[.]" 159 That decision was appealed. 160 The Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that a previous case, A.F.C., involved "strikingly similar" facts, 161 and that the A.F.C. court had held that the gestational surrogate's name had to appear on the birth certificate. 162 The Amadi A. court found the A.F.C. reasoning persuasive and also held that the surrogate's name should appear on the birth certificate. 163 However, in A.F.C., the intended mother had been 153 E.g., In re Amadi A., No. 14-1281, 2014 WL 1956247 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2015). 154 Id. 155 Id. at *1. 156 Id. at *2. 157 Id. 158 Id. ("[T]he court concluded that the woman who gave birth to the children must be listed as the mother on the original birth certificates."). 159 Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102 (48) (2016)). 160 Id. ("The joint petitioners timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court."). 161 Id. at *4. 162 Id. ("Considering the intent of and purpose served by the Vital Records Act and the relevant federal law, the court of appeals determined that "the 'mother' to be entered on the certificate of live birth . . . is the . . . woman who delivers the child." (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-301 (2016))). 163 Id. ("We agree with the court's reasoning in In re Adoption of A.F.C. and likewise hold that the surrogate mother in this case, C.B., should be listed on the birth certificates for the children."). In contrast, the trial court in Amadi A. held that the surrogate was the legal mother and that the intended mother could only be recognized as the legal mother through a stepparent adoption. 165 In Amadi A., there was "no dispute between parties with real and adverse interests," 166 because the intended parents, the surrogate, and her husband all agreed that the intended mother should be recognized as the legal mother. 167 But that meant that the resolution of legal maternity "would not resolve any real controversy," 168 which induced the appellate court to "vacate the juvenile court's finding regarding the legal maternity of the children." 169 The appellate court understood that its holding that legal maternity should be left unresolved might leave the parties frustrated, 170 but reasoned that the legislature should determine who should be declared the parent in this kind of case.
171
Leaving the identity of the child's legal mother an open question cannot be thought good public policy. 172 States interested in promoting stability for a child 173 undermine that goal by leaving the legal relationship between parent and child unresolved until a live controversy presents itself. In the interim, the would-be legal parent may not invest emotionally and financially in the child as much as she otherwise would have. 174 Further, waiting to legally cement the relationship until 164 In re Adoption of A.F.C., 491 S.W.3d 316, 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). 165 In re Amadi A., 2015 WL 1956247, at *2. 166 Id. at *9. 167 Id. 168 Id. 169 Id. 170 Id. at *10 ("We recognize the parties' frustration with the uncertainty in this area of the law."). 171 Id. at *10 ("We . . . urge the Tennessee General Assembly to give Tennessee's courts and citizens guidance in this important and increasingly complex area of the law."). 172 See In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 276-77 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting) (noting that there are disadvantages to being "motherless"). 174 See Purvis, supra note 102, at 213 ("[S]tudies indicate that the emotional relationships between legal parent and child are stronger even than the relationship between a permanent caregiver and child. Having a legal parent as caregiver is thus beneficial for children both financially and emotionally."). there is a live controversy, such as a challenge to the mother's legal parentage, would hardly promote the child's feelings of security and well-being.
175
A non-resolution of legal maternity almost invites future litigation, especially if the legal father should die during the pregnancy 176 or if the surrogate should have a change of heart.
177
In short, leaving maternity unresolved until there is a live controversy is an approach that is not reasonably calculated to promote the interests of children, families, or society.
B. PARENTAL RIGHTS IN CONTESTED TRADITIONAL SURROGACY CASES
Recently, two state supreme courts addressed the enforceability of traditional surrogacy contracts. Both held that the surrogate's parental rights could not be terminated against her will.
178
However, the courts were willing to enforce the contracts in other respects, which may well create a number of future difficulties.
Wisconsin
In re F.T.R. Rosecky's sperm so that the Roseckys would have a child to raise. 181 Marcia Rosecky had previously undergone treatment for leukemia, which had rendered her eggs nonviable. 182 Monica had offered to be a surrogate for the Roseckys, 183 preferring artificial insemination to having an embryo implanted in her uterus. 184 That way, the Roseckys would know the child's family history and there would be a lower probability of multiples. 185 When Marcia had expressed concern that Monica would have difficulty parting with any child born of a traditional surrogacy, 186 Monica assured her that the Roseckys would be able to raise the child.
187
The couples discussed the issues before the pregnancy, agreeing that "Monica and the child would have no legal relationship, Monica would not have formal custody and placement of the child, Monica would see the child through informal social visits, and the Roseckys would raise the child."
188
Both couples had the benefit of legal counsel and their agreement was reflected in a writing 189 signed by all of the parties. 190 During Monica's pregnancy, the Schissels and Roseckys had a falling out. The circuit court eventually granted David Rosecky primary custody with Monica being awarded "two hours of placement per month."
193
After a separate hearing, the circuit court held that the parenting agreement (in which Monica would terminate her own parental rights) was not enforceable.
194
The child, F.T.R., formed an attachment with Marcia, and placement with Monica might harm him "because of Monica's desire to be his mother and to replace Marcia, which would be confusing for F.T.R." 193 Id. 194 Id. ("On February 8, 2011, the court held a hearing and determined that the PA was not enforceable."). 195 Id. at 640. 196 Id. 197 Id. at 640-41. 198 Id. at 641. 199 Id. at 642. 200 Id. 201 Id. she refused to do so. 204 One of the litigated issues was whether those rights could be terminated involuntarily-after all, she had been a party to the parenting agreement specifying that she would surrender her parental rights. 205 The parental rights termination issue was easily resolved-the parenting agreement was unenforceable to the extent that it required Monica to surrender her parental rights. 206 But that did not end the analysis. Wisconsin recognizes that unenforceable provisions in a contract may be severable, 207 especially if a severability clause is included in the contract. 208 The agreement between the Roseckys and the Schissels did include such a clause. 209 Under Wisconsin law, a contractual provision may be severable if deleting that provision would not defeat the primary purpose of the contract.
210
The F.T.R. court reasoned that the "primary purpose of this agreement is to ensure that the Roseckys will be the parents of F.T.R. and will have custody and placement" 211 and that those purposes could be served even if the unenforceable parental rights termination However, the primary purpose presumably included making Marcia the legal parent of F.T.R., and that could not happen while Monica was F.T.R.'s legal parent.
213
It simply is not credible to believe that the Roseckys did not care whether Marcia, rather than Monica, was recognized as F.T.R.'s legal parent, although David argued that it was "not necessary to terminate Monica's parental rights to effectuate the parties' overall intent-for the Roseckys to be the parents of F.T.R., with full custody and placement." Enforcement of surrogacy agreements promotes stability and permanence in family relationships because it allows the intended parents to plan for the arrival of their child, reinforces the expectations of all parties to the agreement, and reduces contentious litigation that could drag on for the first several years of the child's life. 217 The Wisconsin Supreme Court also reversed the circuit court decision on visitation, concluding that "the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by excluding the PA and rendering its custody and placement decision without consideration of the PA." 218 Basically, the circuit court had held the parenting 212 Id. ("The purpose of the PA can be carried out, after severing the TPR portions, by enforcing the custody and placement provisions of the PA." (citing Simenstad v. Hagen, 126 N.W.2d 529, 534 (Wis. 1964))). 213 Id. at 646. 214 Id. at 647. 215 Id. at 651 ("[T]he offending TPR provisions in the PA can be severed from the remainder of the contract without defeating the primary purpose of the agreement."). 216 Id. at 647. 217 Id. at 649-50. 218 Id. at 643. A few points might be made about the state supreme court's criticism of the circuit court. First, the circuit court had accepted that there was a risk of harm in its decision, 224 but had nonetheless decided that the risk was worth taking because of other benefits that might accrue.
225
But if instead the circuit court was, in effect, deciding that cutting off all visitation between Monica and F.T.R. would be contrary to the child's interests, then the state supreme court was telling the circuit court that it should not enforce the parenting agreement provision that cut off visitation. Assuming that the circuit court made the child's best interests the polestar of its 219 Id. at 638. 220 Id. 221 Id. at 641 ("[T]he circuit court awarded sole custody and primary placement of F.T.R. to David and secondary placement to Monica."). 222 Id. 223 Id. 224 Id. at 641 ("The possibility that difficulties may occur and that allowing the Schissels to play a role in the child's life is a risk. But risks are a part of life."). then the remand might not result in a change in the visitation order. 227 Or, even if it did, Monica's visitation might be reduced rather than terminated. 228 When discussing the benefits of enforcing the surrogacy agreement, the state supreme court mentioned that doing so would reinforce the parties' expectations and reduce contentious litigation.
229
All else being equal, those are desirable outcomes. But by conditioning enforcement of the agreement on the child's best interests, the court almost invites surrogates who have had a change of heart to challenge the agreement by asserting that its enforcement would be contrary to the child's interests. Inviting such challenges on that basis neither reinforces party expectations nor reduces contentious litigation.
Suppose that on remand the circuit court modified its visitation order, for example, by refusing to permit overnight visitation on alternate weekends once F.T.R. had reached two years of age. 230 Even so, Marcia still would not have parental rights while Monica retained them. 231 One question left open is who would get custody if something were to happen to David, given that Monica still had some ISSN The Tennessee statute suggests that a gestational surrogate who is carrying a child genetically related to both members of a commissioning married couple does not have parental rights and that there is no need for the wife to adopt the child. 240 However, the statute does not speak to a situation where only one member of the couple is genetically related to the child carried by the gestational surrogate, and Tennessee law with respect to legal maternity in that kind of case is unresolved.
241
The Baby court explained that since the passage of the Tennessee statute, "the General Assembly has not further addressed the propriety of traditional surrogacies."
242
But the legislature's failure to act meant that "the determination of whether public policy prohibits the enforcement of a traditional surrogacy contract has become the obligation of this Court." The Tennessee Supreme Court spelled out some limitations on surrogacy compensation, namely, that the terms of a surrogacy contract pertaining to compensation will only be enforceable to the extent that they are not contingent upon the surrogate's surrender of the child or the termination of her parental rights, and to the extent that they reflect the reasonable costs of services, expenses, or injuries related to the pregnancy, the birth of the child, or other matters inherent to the surrogacy process. 245 Presumably, this limitation would also apply to gestational surrogates in that the compensation would have to be tied to "reasonable costs." 246 However, because "the gestational surrogate has no parental rights recognized under Tennessee law," 247 the compensation provision could not be held unenforceable on the ground that she was allegedly being induced to give up those rights.
With respect to the custody award, the Tennessee court explained that "courts are not bound by any surrogacy contract as to the determination of the best interests of a child." 248 That said, when doing its own best interests analysis, the court "may consider the terms of a surrogacy contract as a factor in the best interest analysis." The court also cited with approval the F.T.R. observation that "these agreements tend to 'promote[ ] stability and permanence in family relationships' and, therefore, can advance the interests of the 244 Finally, the court adopted the F.T.R. approach to severability:
[W]henever possible, courts should interpret a contract in a way that supports its validity and invalidates only the offending contractual terms. In many instances, a court will be able to successfully sever any improper terms related to the termination of parental rights while effectuating the main purpose of the agreement. 253 Nonetheless, the Baby court was not simply directing that the contract be enforced. On the contrary, "when there is a conflict between the contractual terms and the best interests of a child, the best interests as determined by the trial court . . . must be given priority." 254 Further, "the enforcement of a traditional surrogacy contract must occur within the confines of the statutes governing who qualifies as a legal parent and how parental rights may be terminated." 255 But that qualification is important, both because "a traditional surrogate, as the biological mother of the child, is a legal parent until her parental rights are terminated through one of our statutory procedures," 256 and because "[i]n a traditional surrogacy, an intended mother-who, by definition, is not genetically related to the child-may only attain the status of a legal parent through adoption."
257
The Tennessee court was limiting the force of surrogacy contracts in two different respects. First, they are unenforceable if contrary to the child's interests. Second, parental rights can neither be terminated nor acquired by virtue of the contract. 251 Id. (citing In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 649-50). 252 Id. (citing In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 650). 253 Id. at 831 (citing In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 651). 254 Id. (citing Tuetken v. Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d 262, 271 (Tenn. 2010)). 255 Id. at 830. 256 Id. at 831. however, courts will need much more guidance when deciding the extent to which the surrogacy contract should be considered in a best interests analysis. Absent that guidance, one might expect some courts to give it great weight while other courts would give it comparatively little weight, which would create great inconsistency in the jurisprudence and undercut the kind of certainty and predictability that the court seems to value.
IV. CONCLUSION
Up until fairly recently, there seemed to be a growing consensus across the states that gestational but not traditional surrogacy contracts were enforceable. However, decisions in different states have cast doubt on that understanding. Some courts are unwilling to enforce gestational surrogacy agreements even when uncontested, while other courts are giving substantial effect to traditional surrogacy agreements.
The state supreme courts in Wisconsin and Tennessee upheld the enforcement of traditional surrogacy agreements except insofar as they required termination of the surrogate's parental rights. That exception is important. The surrogate may well retain rights to visitation at the very least, and the courts did not address whether subsequent attempts to gain custody or increase visitation should be analyzed as they would be in other cases where each of a child's biological parents has married someone else. Nor did the courts address how a dispute between the intended mother and the surrogate should be handled if the biological father dies or has his rights terminated.
In Wisconsin, the traditional surrogacy parenting agreement should be enforced unless doing so is contrary to the child's best interests, 271 whereas in Tennessee the agreement will be enforced if it promotes the best interests of the child.
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It is simply unclear whether these standards differ as a practical matter; nor is it clear how much weight should be given to the existence of the surrogacy agreement in the initial determination of the child's best interests.
Both state supreme courts suggest that although parental rights termination provisions are invalid, surrogacy contracts are otherwise enforceable if they promote the best interests of the child. Yet, surrogacy contracts as a general matter contemplate no required visitation with the surrogate, which neither supreme court explicitly addressed. 271 In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 642 (Wis. 2013). 272 In re Baby II, 447 S.W.3d at 829.
If the question is not whether, but how much, visitation the surrogate will have (assuming that she is not awarded custody), then it is unclear what is meant when the courts say that such contracts are enforceable except with respect to parental rights termination. If the surrogate can be denied all visitation, then it is uncertain how the surrogate can retain parental rights since the privileges and presumptions associated with that status do not attach. Further, if courts enforce the contract by only permitting the surrogate extremely limited contact, then (depending on state law) the child may be placed with someone who is a virtual stranger if, for some reason, the surrogate is called upon to play a primary parenting role.
The state supreme courts have been given a difficult task. With insufficient guidance from their respective legislatures, they have been asked to resolve the complicated issues that are implicated in surrogacy contracts. However, it seems clear that in several instances courts have not thought through some of the ramifications of the positions they have adopted. While attempting to create a more predictable jurisprudence, these courts have instead made matters more uncertain and left would-be contracting parties even more confused about what they might reasonably expect. Regrettably, the goals of clarity and consistency in the surrogacy context have been undermined and seem even less likely to be attained anytime soon.
